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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Concerned about rising energy prices, global climate change, and 
energy security, Henry Homeowner1 decided to pursue the installa-
tion of a renewable energy system for his suburban home. After ex-
tensive research, Henry concluded that a rooftop photovoltaic solar 
energy collection system was the most prudent option, taking into 
consideration cost, efficiency, and feasibility of installation. Henry’s 
home is located in “Resounding Residences,” a common interest de-
velopment (CID),2 and initially Henry worried that installing a solar 
energy device might conflict with certain restrictions on rooftop “pro-
trusions” imposed by the development’s governing body, the Resound-
ing Residences Community Association. However, in the course of his 
																																																																																																																																	
  J.D. 2013, cum laude, Certificate in Environmental Law, magna cum laude, Flori-
da State University College of Law. I am greatly indebted to Professor Hannah Wiseman 
for her guidance, critiques, and suggestions; Alexandra Moore, for her editing prowess; and 
my parents, Diane and Ronald Rosenthal, for teaching me how to write and instilling in me 
a love of learning that I will carry for life.  
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research, Henry discovered that his state had recently passed the 
“State Solar Rights Act of 2012,” which provided that:  
A. Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, 
an association shall not prohibit the installation or use of a solar 
energy device . . . .  
B. An association may adopt reasonable rules regarding the 
placement of a solar energy device if those rules do not prevent the 
installation, impair the functioning of the device or restrict its use 
or adversely affect the cost of efficiency of the device.3  
 Assuming that the statute would protect his solar energy system, 
Henry decided to proceed as planned and contracted with a company 
named Sol R Us to complete the installation. The company deter-
mined the front half of Henry’s roof, which faces the street, was the 
optimal location to place and align the panels to true south.4 Howev-
er, several days after work had commenced, Henry received notice 
from the community association that he was in violation of a restric-
tive covenant prohibiting homeowners from installing rooftop devices 
(excluding television satellites and antennas) that face the street, 
because such devices create an aesthetic nuisance to neighbors and 
can potentially lower property values. Henry responded that he was 
entitled to install a solar device under the State Solar Rights Act of 
2012, and besides which, the installation was almost finished.  
																																																																																																																																	
 1. Henry Homeowner is an entirely fictional character. However, his story is not so 
far removed from that of real-life California homeowner Stacey Rodman, who made the 
assumption that California’s solar rights law protected his right to install a solar device on 
his home within a common interest development, despite conflicting covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions that applied to his property. See Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 227 
Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 2. CIDs possess “several essential characteristics: common ownership of residential 
property, mandatory membership of all owners in an association that governs the use of 
the common property, and governing documents that provide a ‘constitution’ by which the 
association and its members are governed.” Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, His-
tory and Structure of the Common Interest Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNI-
TIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. 
Silverman eds., 1994). See also Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity 
Crisis of Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 589, 598-99 (1993) (“Simply stated, a common interest community is one in 
which the property owners are tied together with a strong common interest. The interest 
may be in property owned by the community association of which the owners are all mem-
bers, or in property owned by the members themselves. In either case, the organization 
maintains and controls the property, and it embodies the sharing of interest and cohesive-
ness that comes not only from a legal structure but also from that sharing.”). 
 3. This statute is borrowed from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012).  
 4. For maximum efficiency, solar collectors should be responsive to the sun, tilting to 
track its path throughout the year. However, because this adds cost, many opt for fixed 
solar collectors. In a fixed system, solar collectors in the northern hemisphere should al-
ways face true south, while in the southern hemisphere they should face true north. See 
NORTH CAROLINA SOLAR CENTER, SITING OF ACTIVE SOLAR COLLECTORS AND PHOTOVOLTA-
IC MODULES 1 (Revised Sept. 2001), available at http://ncsc.ncsu.edu/wp-content/          
uploads/SitingActive.pdf. 
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 The association filed a covenant enforcement action against Henry 
seeking an injunction requiring him to remove the solar panels. The 
trial court ruled in favor of the association, stating that the associa-
tion’s rules were “reasonable” and did not effectively prohibit Henry 
from installing a solar energy system. Later, while nursing a head-
ache and reviewing a stack of legal and construction bills, Henry 
Homeowner resolved that the costs of environmental and energy con-
sciousness were simply not worth the benefits.  
 While Henry Homeowner’s saga is purely fictional, it is nonethe-
less emblematic of a major hurdle standing between millions of U.S. 
residents and their access to residential solar energy: covenants, con-
ditions, and restrictions, collectively referred to as “CC&Rs,” imposed 
by common-interest developments. Former Vice President and cli-
mate change activist Al Gore was recently hindered by restrictive 
ordinances when he attempted to install solar panels on his Tennes-
see home.5 Others—real life “Henry Homeowners”—have similarly 
found their access to clean, renewable solar energy limited or alto-
gether prohibited by community associations.6 
 CC&Rs are “[c]ovenants running with the land,”7 dictating what a 
homeowner can and cannot do with her property. Oftentimes CC&Rs 
are aesthetic in nature, designed to ensure uniformity in appearance 
and protect property values.8 In the realm of solar energy, CC&Rs 
may outright restrict all solar devices, or they might affect the siting 
of such a device (i.e., where it can and cannot be placed). 
																																																																																																																																	
 5. Gore’s situation involved a town’s ordinances, although they closely resembled the 
types of CC&Rs promulgated by a CID. Gore was eventually able to install a solar energy 
system, and his town has since altered its ordinances as well. See Kristina Caffrey, The 
House of the Rising Sun: Homeowners’ Associations, Restrictive Covenants, Solar Panels, 
and the Contract Clause, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721, 731 (2010).  
 6. See Scott Condon, Solar Showdown in Some Neighborhoods, VAIL DAILY (July 9, 
2007), http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20070709/NEWS/70709026; Ray Henry, Homeown-
ers Associations and Solar Panels Don’t Always Mix, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2012, 
4:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/25/homeowners-associations-solar-
panels_n_1451234.html; Carolyn Quinn, Homeowner Sues Association over Solar Panels, 
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Oct. 21, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.vcstar.com/news/2008/oct/21/ 
homeowner-sues-association-over-solar-panels-he/. 
 7. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COM-
MUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW §1.05(b)(3) (3d ed. 2000). CC&Rs are, more generally, servitudes. 
They all run with the land (if written properly) and either impose negative or affirmative 
obligations on all owners within the subdivision. Another non-technical definition of re-
strictive covenants defines them as follows: “A restrictive covenant is a promise made by 
one property owner to limit the use of his or her realty . . . so as to benefit other parties. 
Restrictive covenants are commonly used by planned communities to ensure that all units 
adhere to a common design theme, and to prevent activities deemed to be undesirable by 
the community at large.” THOMAS STARRS, LES NELSON & FRED ZALCMAN, BRINGING       
SOLAR ENERGY TO THE PLANNED COMMUNITY: A HANDBOOK ON ROOFTOP SOLAR                             
SYSTEMS AND PRIVATE LAND USE RESTRICTIONS 12 (2000), available at 
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/erprebate/documents/CC+Rs_and_solar_rights.pdf.  
 8. As one attorney put it: “([H]omeowners associations) are all about looks. Is your 
lawn green? Are your hedges trimmed?” Henry, supra note 6. 
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 State legislatures have attempted to provide protection for solar 
energy users—both residential and commercial—by passing solar 
access laws.9 As of 2012, forty states have some form of solar access 
law on their books, with some local governments taking action as 
well.10 These laws are diverse in makeup but can provide a number of 
rights and protections, including: the right to install a solar device on 
a property subject to countervailing building codes or local ordinanc-
es; the creation of a solar easement; and provisions mandating the 
removal of vegetation that blocks sunlight.11 Twenty-one states have 
also specifically addressed CC&Rs that “effectively prohibit” or “un-
reasonably interfere” with a homeowner’s ability to install a solar 
energy generation system.12 Despite these efforts, the path to resi-
dential solar use in CIDs remains full of potential obstacles, partially 
due to ineffective and unclear solar access laws that leave too much 
room for community associations to continue to restrict the use and 
placement of solar devices. Some associations are unaware of the so-
lar access laws that apply to their CC&Rs.13 Other associations have 
maintained outright bans on solar devices—or the equivalent—
despite the existence of laws preventing them from doing so.14  
 Community associations are, to a large extent, right to feel so em-
powered. When a homeowner within a CID wishes to undertake a 
home improvement project—such as a solar installation—CC&Rs will 
often require the homeowner to seek prior approval from the associa-
tion’s governing board.15 Courts are highly deferential to the deci-
sions made by these boards; many courts apply a form of the business 
judgment rule when assessing an association board’s decision. 16 
																																																																																																																																	
 9. The website “Go Solar California” defines solar access rights as “protections to 
allow consumers access to sunlight (and prevent shading of systems) and to limits [sic] the 
ability of homeowner associations (HOA) and local governments from preventing installa-
tion of solar energy systems.” STATE OF CAL. ET AL., Solar Rights: Access to the Sun for 
Solar Systems, GO SOLAR CALIFORNIA, http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/solar_basics/ 
rights.php (last visited July 6, 2013).  
 10. State Solar Access Laws, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/             
summarymaps/Solar_Access_Map.pdf (last visited July 6, 2013). Included in the forty state 
total are states that have only passed provisions pertaining to the creation of solar ease-
ments. 
 11. See COLLEEN MCCANN KETTLES, FLA. SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH & EDUC., A      
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SOLAR ACCESS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Oct. 2008),          
available at http://www.solarabcs.org/about/publications/reports/solar-access/pdfs/         
Solaraccess-full.pdf. 
 12. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE, 
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited July 6, 2013); see also infra Appendix A.  
 13. STARRS, NELSON & ZALCMAN, supra note 7, at 37. 
 14. See Condon, supra note 6 (“Some homeowners associations have adopted re-
strictions that make it more costly or even impossible for members to install solar electric 
or thermal devices, despite a Colorado law barring such limits.”). 
 15. These boards are generally made up of members from the community. 
 16. See, e.g., Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 
(N.Y. 1990); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523, 529 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1987). 
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Common law principles also strongly favor the enforceability of pri-
vate contractual agreements, including CC&Rs.17 In the end, as one 
commentator noted, “more than likely, community associations will 
win in court if the family agreed to rules when joining a community.”18 
 Considering the deferential treatment community associations 
receive in the courts, the importance of solar access laws becomes 
clear—without them, homeowners face nearly impossible odds when 
challenging the adverse decision of an association board. But can so-
lar access laws turn the tide in favor of homeowners? Despite the 
spread of statutes addressing solar rights, little case law involving 
homeowners pitted against their associations has developed, perhaps 
due to homeowners deciding to abandon their efforts rather than po-
tentially face litigation.19 Solar access laws are also a relatively re-
cent phenomenon.20 However, several cases indicate that courts will 
carefully scrutinize the language of solar access laws in deter-       
mining how they impact a traditional review of an association               
board’s decision.21 Statutory construction of these laws is thus of                    
critical importance. 
 This Note utilizes some of the case law that does exist to demon-
strate how states can craft laws that effectively protect the rights of 
homeowners to install a solar energy system in the face of prohibitive 
CC&Rs. Part II explores the history and development of common-
interest communities. Part III surveys the various solar access laws 
that exist at the state level, with a focus on how these laws affect the 
rights of homeowners living in CIDs. I will also address whether 
these laws can withstand scrutiny under the Contract Clause. Part 
IV concerns the resolution of disputes between homeowners and as-
sociations. Finally, Part V presents some essential attributes of an 
effective residential solar access law.  
																																																																																																																																	
 17. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 737. 
 18. Mark A. Pike, Note, Green Building Red-Lighted by Homeowners’ Associations, 33 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 923, 935 (2009). 
 19. Larry Lohrman, a homeowner in a CID in Salem, Oregon, successfully argued 
against his community association’s rejection of his request to install solar panels. Yet at 
one point, he “nearly abandoned the effort in frustration.” Henry, supra note 6. 
 20. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012) (enacted in 2007); TEX. PROP. 
CODE ANN. § 202.010(b) (West 2012) (enacted in 2011).  
 21. 	See, e.g., Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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II.   THE COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT  
 “With little fanfare or notice, common interest communities have 
become the dominant form of new community development in the 
United States . . . .”22 Yet the CID is by no means a new concept. Its 
origins stem from medieval Europe, where peasants received land for 
cultivation and in return promised not to use the soil in ways that 
might adversely affect their neighbors.23 CIDs were imported to the 
United States in the 1830s, where communities were created “to pro-
tect residents with restrictive covenants such as ones that prohibited 
certain religious activities, dictated racial makeup, and prescribed 
the way in which the land could be used.”24  
 Common interest developments began to flourish following the 
Second World War, coinciding with the growth of “suburbia,”25 but 
they truly exploded over a thirty-year period spanning from 1970 to 
2000.26 In 1970, there were 10,000 such communities containing 2.1 
million residents.27 By 2000, there were more than 222,000 CIDs, 
housing 45.2 million residents.28  
 As of 2012, there were 323,600 association-governed communi-
ties 29  in the United States containing some 25.9 million housing 
units.30 Roughly twenty percent of all Americans live in some form of 
association-governed community.31 The CID model for residential de-
velopment is as popular as ever, particularly in states like California, 
Florida, and Texas, where “ ‘nearly all new residential development 
is governed by a [CID].’ ”32  
A. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) 
 As previously mentioned, CIDs are governed by an oftentimes 
elaborate set of rules referred to collectively as covenants, conditions, 
																																																																																																																																	
 22. Steven Siegel, A New Paradigm for Common Interest Communities: Reforming 
Community Associations Through the Adoption of Model Governing Documents that Reject 
Intricate Rule-Bound Legal Boilerplate in Favor of Clarity, Transparency and Accountabil-
ity, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 27, 28 (2011). 
 23. Pike, supra note 18, at 929. 
 24. Id. Some examples include: “New York’s Gramercy Park (1831), Boston’s Louis-
burg Square (1844), and San Francisco’s South Park (1852) . . . .” Id. at 929 n.39. 
 25. Id. at 929. 	 26.	 See Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 6, 2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (“Association-governed communities include homeowners associations, condo-
miniums, cooperatives and other planned communities.”).  
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. (stating that 63.4 million Americans live in some form of CID).  
 32. Siegel, supra note 22, at 30 (citation omitted). 
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and restrictions (CC&Rs).33 Such rules are typically laid out in a 
community’s declaration of CC&Rs, also sometimes referred to as a 
declaration of condominium.34 This “master document” is similar to a 
local government’s comprehensive plan and will often contain “ ‘the 
plan of development and ownership, the proposed method of opera-
tion, and the rights and responsibilities of owners within the associa-
tion.’ ”35 Prior to the sale of any unit within a CID, the declaration 
is—or at least is supposed to be—recorded, thus providing buyers 
with actual or constructive notice of its contents.36  
 Community associations have at their disposal an alternative way 
to create binding restrictions: ad hoc decisions and resolutions made 
by the association board, typically in response to a particular case or 
controversy in the community.37 These boards, generally composed of 
and elected by the community’s membership, are responsible for en-
forcing the association’s rules.38 When a homeowner seeks to install a 
solar energy generation system, she often must seek approval from 
the board, as would a homeowner who wants to undertake a major 
addition to his property, such as constructing a swimming pool.39 The 
decision made by the board in such a situation can thereafter create a 
condition or restriction affecting other CID residents.40  
 In the past, restrictions were utilized to preclude “undesirable” 
minority and/or religious groups from owning property. 41  For in-
stance, a number of communities in the 1940s enacted restrictions 
preventing racial minorities from owning property therein.42 Similar-
ly, in the nineteenth century, some communities enacted restrictions 
that were intended to prevent alcoholism and other socially de-
nounced habits.43 Today, CC&Rs are generally aimed at restricting 
certain property uses and ensuring uniformity of appearance.44 Un-
																																																																																																																																	
 33. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESI-
DENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 20 (1994). 
 34. Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Re-
view of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663, 672 (2000). 
 35. Id. (quoting WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION 
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.05 (b)(3) (2d ed. 1988)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. See, e.g., KEENE MILL VILL. IV HOMEOWNERS ASS’N, ARCHITECTURAL STANDARDS 
& PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.keenemillvillage.org/documents/       
Architectural.pdf. 
 40. See Franzese, supra note 34, at 672. 
 41. Pike, supra note 18, at 929. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Dana Young, Common Interest Developments: An Historical Overview of CID De-
velopment 2 (Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law, Working 
Papers Series Fall 1996-02). 
 44. Pike, supra note 18, at 929-30, 932. 
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doubtedly, “the overall objective is to guarantee uniformity in order 
to preserve stability, and, ultimately, property value.”45  
B.   Perception and Reality: Common Interest Developments and 
Their Residents 
 Despite one recent commentator’s depiction of CIDs as “picky au-
thoritarian neighborhood organizations run by ex-high school vice 
principals,”46 CIDs can and do serve some legitimate purposes; for 
example, CIDs provide for the development of private infrastructure 
and the creation of common recreational areas, such as swimming 
pools and gymnasiums.47 Moreover, there is something to be said for 
the desire of people to live in clean, safe neighborhoods, amongst 
neighbors who (in theory, at least) share their values.48 Overwhelm-
ingly, residents seem to enjoy living in CIDs, with seventy percent of 
respondents to a 2012 poll rating their overall experience living in a 
CID as “positive.”49 Respondents in the same poll also answered fa-
vorably when asked whether their association boards “serve the best 
interests of the community as a whole.”50  
 Regarding the effect of CIDs on property values, the picture is not 
entirely clear. Despite the fact that preserving property value is gen-
erally considered one of the cornerstone objectives of the common in-
terest development, there is little data to support a positive correla-
tion. One could further argue that if an association defaults on its 
responsibilities and the community’s infrastructure and common ar-
																																																																																																																																	
 45. Id. at 932.  
 46. Id. at 934. 
 47. See id. at 934 & n.83. 
 48. See id. In a 2007 poll of CID residents, clean/attractive neighborhoods and safe 
neighborhoods were amongst the most frequently reported answers in response to the 
question, “What is the single best thing about living in a community association?” ZOGBY 
INT’L, FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION RESEARCH TRACKING POLL 15 (2007), 
available at http://www.cmgcharleston.com/managers_files/Zogby_HOA_Survey_2007.pdf. 
49. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, WHO SHOULD JUDGE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION SUCCESS? 
THE RESIDENTS WHO LIVE IN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS! 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Documents/National_ Homeowner_Research.pdf. It 
should be noted that concerns exist regarding the partisanship of the Community Associa-
tion Institute (CAI), which conducted this and other surveys referenced in this Note. Sev-
eral commentators have stated that the organization appears to exist primarily to serve 
the interests of “industry insiders,” that is, developers, community association managers, 
lawyers, etc., rather than homeowners. Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing Pri-
vate Residential Communities: Towards a New Formulation of Local Government Land Use 
Policies that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the Unit-
ed States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 871-72 n.31 (2006) (“CAI is well-known for protecting the 
interests of the industry.”). See also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIA-
TIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 136 (1994).	
 50. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 49, at 4. Eighty-eight percent responded that the 
elected members of their association boards either absolutely, or for the most part, served 
the best interests of the community as a whole. Id.  
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eas fall into disrepair, property values could suffer as a result.51 
Nonetheless, CID residents believe that the CC&Rs governing their 
communities “protect and enhance” property values.52 This is likely 
due, at least in part, to a view that the presence of CC&Rs and asso-
ciation governance is a means of ensuring consistency and stability in 
the community.53 As one homeowner stated, “I wanted the communi-
ty to stay the way it looked when I bought my home. A homeowners’ 
association was the only way I could control my neighbors over time.”54  
 As a result of the various restrictions imposed by CC&Rs, resi-
dents must necessarily relinquish some of their freedoms. For exam-
ple, many community associations prohibit basketball hoops, boats, 
satellite dishes, and various other objects considered to be “aesthetic 
nuisances.”55 Restrictions regulating lawn care and landscaping are 
also commonplace.56 A Florida man actually served jail time after be-
ing cited by his community association for failing to maintain his 
lawn.57  Another CID resident in Medford, New York was forced to 
remove a statue of the Virgin Mary from her lawn,58 raising all sorts 
of First Amendment questions in the process.59 As can be expected, 
such restrictive measures can often breed disagreement and discon-
																																																																																																																																	
 51. The author served as a law clerk at a Florida agency tasked with administrative 
oversight of community association managers (CAMs). The agency frequently received 
complaints from homeowners containing allegations that their community associations 
were not performing their responsibilities. Complainants would often go on to argue that 
their property values were suffering as a result. 
 52. IBOPE ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 49, at 5 (finding that in 2012, seventy-six percent 
of respondents said that the rules in their community “protect and enhance” property val-
ues). 
 53. “One significant factor in the continued popularity of the common interest form of 
property ownership is the ability of homeowners to enforce restrictive CC & R’s against 
other owners (including future purchasers) of project units.” Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. 
Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994). 
 54. Gregory S. Alexander, Conditions of “Voice”: Passivity, Disappointment, and De-
mocracy in Homeowner Associations, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOV-
ERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 157. 
 55. See Pike, supra note 18, at 934.  
 56. See Henry, supra note 6. The city of Albuquerque, New Mexico recently held that 
even in the desert, CIDs can require homeowners to keep and maintain lawns. Dan McKay, 
Lawns Can Be Required, City Council Votes, ABQ J. (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/032341574109newsmetro08-03-10.htm. 
 57. Erin Sullivan, Man Jailed for Brown Lawn Gets Help From Neighbors, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/ 
article850257.ece. 
 58. Jonathan Starkey, Condo Owners Told to Remove Religious Statues, FREE REPUB-
LIC (Oct. 10, 2007, 9:46 AM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 1909162/posts. 
 59. A full consideration of this topic is outside the scope of this article. Some commen-
tators have expressed concern over whether under the scaled back “State Action Doctrine,” 
citizens in CIDs have contractually agreed to a curtailment of their First Amendment 
rights. See generally Adrienne Iwamoto Suarez, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions . . . 
on Free Speech? First Amendment Rights in Common-Interest Communities, 40 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 739 (2006); Aaron R. Gott, Note, Ticky Tacky Little Governments? A More 
Faithful Approach to Community Associations Under the State Action Doctrine, 40 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 201 (2012). 
1004  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:995	
 
	
tent amongst residents. A protracted dispute over a swing set led one 
homeowner in a Pennsylvania CID to ask, “Who are these little Hit-
lers making these rules?”60  
 Moreover, for some homeowners, discovering that their property is 
subject to CC&Rs and association governance can come as a sur-
prise.61 Twelve percent of respondents in a national 2007 poll of CID 
residents indicated they were not informed prior to purchasing their 
homes that their properties were subject to association governance.62 
A survey of CID residents in Arizona found that only ten percent of 
the respondents had actually read the rules prior to closing on their 
homes.63 This may be due, at least in part, to ambivalence; more than 
three-quarters of respondents in the same survey indicated they 
placed little importance on the existence of a homeowners’ associa-
tion.64 As one homeowner put it: “I would have bought my home if it 
didn’t have [an association]. . . . The most important factors in my 
decision were price, location, [and] functionality of the home. Pres-
ence or absence of a homeowners’ association did not sway me one 
way or the other.”65 
 Yet homeowners interested in “going solar” may want to start pay-
ing attention. Considering community associations regulate lawn or-
naments and basketball hoops, it should come as no surprise that 
they also frequently restrict the placement and/or design of solar de-
vices.66 CC&Rs might require solar devices to be placed out-of-sight of 
neighboring views,67 impose setback or height restrictions,68 or even 
dictate the color of solar panels. 69  Some community associations 
have even gone so far as to ban any and all solar devices               
without qualification.70  
 After one Georgia resident’s request to install a rooftop solar de-
vice was denied by his association, he compared his experience to 
																																																																																																																																	
 60. Mary McCullough, It’s a Swing Set! There Goes the Neighborhood Integrity, Value 
and Beauty Are At Stake, Say a Development’s Rules. The Swing Set Must Go, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (Oct. 9, 1991), http://articles.philly.com/1991-10-09/news/25814221_1_swing-
homeowners-association-chartwell/2. 
 61. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 155.  
 62. ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 48, at 19. 
 63. Alexander, supra note 54, at 155. 
 64. Id. at 156. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 	
 67. “Solar Units not on the roof should be . . . concealed from the neighboring view.” 
Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman, 182 Cal. App. 3d 324, n.2 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 68. “Solar Units not on the roof should be maintained a minimum of [five feet] from 
property line.” Id. “Solar Units should be in or below the plane of roofing material.” Id.  
 69.  “Panel material should be dark in color.” Id.  
 70. Some real-life examples include: “Solar panels and solar collectors are prohibited”; 
“Exterior solar collection systems . . . or other similar appliances are prohibited.” Stan Cox, 
The Property Cops: Homeowner Associations Ban Eco-Friendly Practices, ALTERNET (Apr. 
25, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/envirohealth/51001. 
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“living under communism—someone gets to dictate every possible 
thing you do.”71 The next section discusses one of the primary means 
by which states have acted to protect the rights of citizens and busi-
nesses seeking to employ a solar energy generation system: solar   
access laws.  
III.   SOLAR ACCESS LAWS 
 Although solar access laws are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
the concept of a “right to sunlight” is considerably older.72 The doc-
trine of “Ancient Lights” is an English common law concept whereby 
“a person who opened a window in his house had a natural right to 
receive the flow of light that passed through it.”73 The doctrine essen-
tially created a negative easement preventing the owner of property 
from obstructing sunlight to her neighbors.74 This common law prin-
ciple was eventually codified in the Prescription Act of 1832: 
When the access and use of light to and for any . . . building shall 
have been actually enjoyed therewith for the full period of twenty 
years without interruption, the right thereto shall be deemed abso-
lute and indefeasible, any local usage or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed 
by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that 
purpose by deed or writing.75 
 However, the doctrine of Ancient Lights was never incorporated 
into American common law.76 Concerned the doctrine would thwart 
development,77 U.S. courts have consistently rejected a common law 
right to sunlight, as evidenced, for example, in Fontainebleau Hotel 
Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.78  
 Perhaps due in part to the absence of common law protections, the 
majority of states have enacted some form of solar access law.79 To be 
sure, in passing these laws, some states seek to promote the use of 
renewable energy,80 and not just to ensure that residents have ade-
																																																																																																																																	
 71. Henry, supra note 6.  
 72. KETTLES, supra note 11, at iii.  
 73. Id. at 1.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Prescription Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, § 3 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Will4/2-3/71/section/3. 
 76. See KETTLES, supra note 11, at 2.  
 77. Debbie Leonard & Denise Pasquale, Legal Tools to Protect Access to Solar         
and Wind Resources, NEV. LAWYER, July 2009, at 14, 15, available at 
http://www.mcdonaldcarano.com/read_news/view.asp?ID=133. 
 78. 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). “No American decision has been cited, 
and independent research has revealed none, in which it has been held that—in the ab-
sence of some contractual or statutory obligation—a landowner has a legal right to the free 
flow of light and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor.” Id.  
 79. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 12. 
 80. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-7 (2012) (“The legislature finds that in view of 
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quate light to grow gardens or avoid shading of their pool. In Florida, 
for example, “[t]he Legislature intends that the use of solar energy, 
renewable energy sources, highly efficient systems, cogeneration, and 
load-control systems be encouraged.”81 Analysis of state solar access 
laws reveals that they vary in scope and nature. This section will 
survey the protections such laws provide to homeowners.  
A. Solar Access Laws and the Contract Clause: “To Unreasonably  
Restrict or Not to Unreasonably Restrict” 
 Although forty states have enacted some form of solar access law, 
only twenty-one contain any sort of provision directed at CC&Rs.82 
While the language of these statutes varies, virtually all of them pro-
vide that community associations may continue to promulgate and 
enforce “reasonable” regulations pertaining to solar energy systems. 
Specifically, eighteen of the twenty-one state statutes that address 
CC&Rs allow for either: (1) “reasonable restrictions,” 83  or (2) re-
strictions that either do not “effectively prohibit” or “unduly re-
strict”84 a homeowner’s ability to install a solar device.85 For instance, 
a Colorado law provides that “[a] covenant, restriction, or condition 
contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other in-
strument . . . that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation or 
use of a renewable energy generation device is void and unenforcea-
ble.”86 In Wisconsin, “[a]ll restrictions on platted land that prevent or 
unduly restrict the construction and operation of solar energy sys-
tems . . . are void.”87  
 Why not enact a law containing a blanket prohibition of CC&Rs 
that have any effect on the ability of a homeowner to install a solar 
device? To be sure, legislatures simply might not be willing to go that 
																																																																																																																																	
the present energy crisis, all renewable energy sources must be encouraged for the benefit 
of the state as a whole. The legislature further finds that solar energy is a viable energy 
source in New Mexico, and as such, its development should be encouraged. Since solar 
energy may be used in small-scale installations and one of the ways to accomplish such 
encouragement is by protection of rights necessary for small-scale installations, the legisla-
ture declares such protection to be the purpose of the Solar Recordation Act and necessary 
to the public interest.”). 
 81. Fla. H.R. Envtl. & Natural Res. Council, HB 7135 (2008) Staff Analysis 3 (final 
Apr. 16, 2008). 
 82. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note 12. See 
also infra Appendix A for a complete breakdown of solar access laws and how they relate to 
CC&Rs.  
 83. States following this model are these: Louisiana, California, Nevada, Utah (but 
only plat renewal/approval), Indiana, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Massachusetts, and 
Washington. See infra Appendix A. 
 84. States following this model are these: Wisconsin, Colorado, New Mexico, Illinois, 
West Virginia, North Carolina, Vermont, and Florida. See infra Appendix A. 
 85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 163.04 (2012). 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168(1)(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 87. WIS. STAT. § 236.292(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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far. Yet the answer also may lie, at least in part, in Article I, Section 
10, Clause 1 of the Constitution, also known as the Contract Clause.88 
A large body of scholarship exists concerning the Contract Clause, 
and a full discussion is well beyond the scope of this Note.89 Nonethe-
less, some discussion is necessary in order to understand why state 
and local governments may err on the side of caution and, additional-
ly, why such caution may potentially be unwarranted.  
 The Contract Clause limits the power of the state and federal gov-
ernment to pass laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”90 A 
plain language reading of the Contract Clause therefore might indi-
cate that governments have virtually no power to pass legislation 
that affects the ability of private parties to freely contract. Yet this is 
far from a reality. The seminal case pertaining to the Contract 
Clause is Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.91 In this case, in 
which the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota law 
passed during the Great Depression that postponed foreclosure sales, 
the Court described in great detail the history and intent of the Con-
tract Clause.92 The Court explained that the Contract Clause was 
particularly intended to cover one type of contractual relationship in 
particular—“that which exists between debtor and creditor.”93 
 The more recent case of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas 
Power & Light Co.94 specifically addressed the Contract Clause as it 
relates to the police power. There, the Supreme Court found that 
where a state law impairs contractual interests but “rests on, and is 
prompted by, significant and legitimate state interests,”95 such a law 
might be proper. The Court fashioned a multi-part method of analy-
sis for addressing such claims.96 First, a court must decide whether 
the law in question has “ ‘operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship.’ ”97 If a substantial impairment exists, then 
the state “must [offer] a significant and legitimate public purpose be-
hind the regulation.”98 After the state has identified its public pur-
pose, the court must consider “whether the adjustment of ‘the rights 
and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable 
																																																																																																																																	
 88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  
 89. For an extensive discussion of the Contract Clause as it pertains to solar access 
laws—and why such laws can withstand scrutiny under the Contract Clause—see Caffrey, 
supra note 5, at 748-58. 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 91. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 92. Id. at 427-30. 
 93. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 750 (citing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 427). 
 94. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). 
 95. Id. at 416. 
 96. Id. at 411-12. 
 97. Id. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 
(1978)).  
 98. Id. at 411 (citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).  
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conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose 
justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.’ ”99  
 This final prong, wherein the adjustment of a contract must be 
based upon “reasonable conditions,”100 contains the key to why state 
statutes allow CIDs to have at least some ability to regulate solar de-
vices. It is furthermore, at least in the eyes of one commentator, the 
reason why a number of states specifically reference the word “rea-
sonable” in their statutes.101 “The statutes definitely do adjust the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual and the community asso-
ciation, but they do so in a reasonable way—and some of the better 
drafted laws even define ‘reasonable.’ ”102  
 Would state legislation that declares void any covenant that af-
fects a homeowner’s ability to install a solar device withstand a chal-
lenge under the Contract Clause? The answer is unclear, although it 
is worth noting that the test advanced by the Court in Energy Re-
serves Group leaves substantial discretion to the courts in its applica-
tion. There are thus several avenues by which such a law could po-
tentially survive scrutiny under the Contract Clause. A court could 
avoid the reasonableness question altogether by finding that the 
law’s impairment of contractual obligations does not rise to the level 
of “substantial.” Alternatively, Kristina Caffrey has suggested that in 
regulating the placement of solar devices, community associations 
have essentially assumed a function traditionally performed by state 
and local governments: “All the way back to Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty, state and local governments have told property owners 
what they can and cannot do and where they can or cannot do      
it.”103 Thus, courts could view solar access laws as “taking back”               
the responsibility of zoning and land use planning from                    
community associations.104  
 Should a court find that a solar access law imposes a substantial 
impairment, it could nonetheless uphold the law under the reasona-
bleness prong, especially in light of what it may see as a particularly 
important public purpose (i.e., decreasing dependence on foreign oil, 
climate change and air pollution concerns, or rising energy prices).  
Furthermore, considering the way in which Contract Clause analysis 
has changed over the years,105 often in response to the “times,” it is 
conceivable that the Court could continue to refine its approach. One 
																																																																																																																																	
 99. Id. at 412 (quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22). 
 100.  Id. 
 101. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 756.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 755 (footnote omitted). 
 104. Id. (alteration in original).  
 105. For instance, consider the different analyses adopted by the court in the two cases 
described above, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 459 U.S. 400 
(1983), and Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).  
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way in which it could potentially do so would be to focus on the appli-
cation of the contractual obligation in question. For instance, CC&Rs 
that conflict with solar access laws may be deemed void as applied to 
solar panels ad hoc, yet legitimate as applied to other things (such as 
a television antenna or other object that does not provide the utility 
of a solar device). 
 Before leaving this brief inquiry into the Contract Clause, it bears 
mentioning that homeowners might themselves attempt to invoke 
the Contract Clause to argue that CC&Rs are preventing them from 
entering contractual agreements with utility companies. Such an “in-
verse” Contract Clause argument would run as follows: in recent 
years, a number of utility providers have entered into “net energy 
metering” (NEM) contracts with residential customers that have in-
stalled solar electrical systems.106 Under such an agreement,  
the customer’s electric meter keeps track of how much electricity is 
consumed by the customer, and how much excess electricity is 
generated by the system and sent back into the electric utility grid. 
. . . [T]he customer has to pay only for the net amount of electricity 
used from the utility over-and-above the amount of electricity gen-
erated by their solar system.107  
A homeowner might therefore argue that CC&Rs are impairing her 
right to enter into NEM contracts. Naturally, this line of reasoning 
raises a number of other contractual issues that are well beyond the 
scope of this Note. Nonetheless, it is illustrative of an untapped 
means by which homeowners can challenge anti-solar CC&Rs. 
B.  The Curious Case of Oregon 
 Enacted in 2012, Oregon’s residential solar access law employs a 
unique method of regulating residential solar energy.108 Instead of 
allowing certain “reasonable” restrictions on solar devices and then 
working to define those restrictions, the statute takes the opposite 
approach. First, it grants a presumption of validity to solar devices in 
any area zoned as residential, by stating that “[t]he installation and 
use on a residential structure of a solar photovoltaic energy system or 
a solar thermal energy system is an outright permitted use in any 
zone in which residential structures are an allowed use.”109 The stat-
ute then establishes that approval of a homeowner’s permit to install 
a solar device is a “ministerial function,”110 so long as: 
																																																																																																																																	
 106. STATE OF CAL. ET AL., Net Energy Metering in California, GO SOLAR CALIFORNIA,  
http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/solar_basics/net_metering.php (last visited July 6, 
2013). 
 107. Id. 
 108. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.505 (2012). 
 109. Id. § 227.505(1) (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. § 227.505(3). 
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(a) The installation of a solar energy system can be accomplished 
without increasing the footprint of the residential or commercial 
structure or the peak height of the portion of the roof on which the 
system is installed; and  
(b) The solar energy system would be mounted so that the plane of 
the system is parallel to the slope of the roof.111  
 By classifying the granting of a solar permit as a ministerial act 
and then laying out the only applicable qualifications, the statute 
appears to broadly empower homeowners. However, questions re-
main. Although the law makes approval of a permit a ministerial 
function, it does not speak to CC&Rs that might nonetheless apply to 
a homeowner living within a CID. One could imagine a situation 
where a homeowner receives a permit, yet an association board does 
not grant approval to a homeowner’s solar installation. Can the 
homeowner proceed and argue that (a) he had a validly issued per-
mit, and (b) the statute states that the installation of a solar device is 
an outright permitted use? 
 Moreover, the statute may implicate the Contract Clause as well. 
Recall the test employed by the Court in Energy Reserves Group, re-
quiring a consideration of “whether the adjustment of ‘the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable con-
ditions.’ ”112 Associations will likely argue that under Oregon’s law, 
calling it an “adjustment” of rights is a misnomer, as they can claim 
to have lost all of their rights under existing CC&Rs to regulate the 
use and placement of solar devices. Yet as previously discussed, there 
are several lines of reasoning a reviewing court could invoke to up-
hold the law.113  
 Presently, I am unaware of any pending challenges to Oregon’s 
solar access law predicated on the Contract Clause, although it 
should be noted that as of this writing, the law has been in place for 
less than a year. Unfortunately, despite the forthcoming discussion114 
pertaining to the importance of precisely defining the rights of the 
affected parties (homeowners and community associations) in the in-
terest of avoiding costly litigation, the courts may eventually be 
needed to determine whether laws such as Oregon’s can withstand 





 111. Id. 
 112. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 
(1983) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). 
 113. See supra Part III.A. 
 114. See infra Part V.A (discussing ambiguous statutory language). 
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IV.   UP AGAINST THE ODDS: RESOLUTION OF                                       
HOMEOWNER/ASSOCIATION DISPUTES 
 As one commentator recently noted, “the broad rule-making and 
rule-enforcement functions entrusted to association boards renders 
conflict inevitable.”115 Consider the following case study:  
In the unusually warm autumn months of 2010, the High Desert 
homeowners’ Board of Directors in Albuquerque, New Mexico, ex-
ploded in controversy. The issue? A resident complained about the 
solar panels on a neighbor's roof. . . . In this dispute between indi-
vidual neighbors, the governing body of the High Desert develop-
ment will eventually have to take a position on the future of solar 
energy in the neighborhood–if not an actual substantive position, 
then at least a position on resolving disputes between neighbors 
over solar energy. . . . New Mexico’s solar-siting-guarantee statute 
will also likely come into play, although it may prove more of a 
problem than a solution. Given the extremely problematic lan-
guage of New Mexico’s statute, this small-scale controversy could 
easily erupt into a huge mess with both sides arguing over statuto-
ry construction and public policy. One board member even warned, 
“[w]e’ll end up in court if someone doesn’t get a handle on this.”116 
 Despite the board member’s warning, there is a scant body of case 
law featuring homeowners seeking judicial approval of a solar project 
in the face of prohibitive CC&Rs and/or an adverse decision by an 
association board. Homeowners may simply abandon plans for a solar 
device in the face of potential legal hurdles, figuring that the up-front 
costs of installation are substantial enough as is before factoring in 
legal fees, as well (think Henry Homeowner). Others likely realize 
that any legal challenge they could mount faces an uphill battle con-
sidering the deference courts give to the decisions of community asso-
ciation boards. 117  The first two sections of this Part concern the 
standard of review and burden of proof utilized by courts when cases 
pitting homeowners against their community associations come be-
fore them. The third section takes a look at a case involving a solar-
inclined homeowner that did end up in court. 
 A.   Judicial Deference to Community Associations 
 As briefly discussed in the introduction, courts have generally 
treated the decisions of community association boards with consider-
able deference.118 However, the actual standard under which such 
cases are evaluated varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, despite 
																																																																																																																																	
 115. Franzese, supra note 34, at 674. 
 116. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 723-24 (footnotes omitted). 
 117.  See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.  
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the proclamation by at least one court that “a single standard for ju-
dicial review of the propriety of board action is desirable.”119  
 Many courts apply a form of the business judgment rule in review-
ing actions taken by an association board.120 A concept borrowed from 
corporate law, the business judgment rule establishes the presump-
tion that the directors of a corporation are motivated “in their con-
duct by a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose 
affairs the stockholders have committed to their charge.”121 In other 
words, directors receive the benefit of the doubt that their actions 
were in the best interest of the corporation, and substantial evidence 
to the contrary is required to find otherwise. Many such cases also 
involve a discussion of fiduciary duties,122 thus clearly establishing 
that many courts see association boards as roughly analogous to   
corporate entities.123  
 In fact, the majority of modern community associations are incor-
porated as non-profit corporations.124 However, commentators have 
pointed out the flaws in applying standard corporate law to these en-
tities: “[T]o superimpose corporate or business models upon residen-
tial, family settings seems inconsistent with, if not a dehumanization 
of, the values, norms, and needs of home life.”125 The decisions of as-
sociation boards have a real, tangible impact on the way in which 
people live within their homes and communities. This is not to say 
that the decisions of a standard corporation’s board are not capable of 
having a direct impact on individuals; on the contrary, they often 
have profound repercussions. Yet while corporations exist for the 
purpose of maximizing profit,126 community associations exist for the 
betterment of the communities they serve.  
 Moreover, corporate directors cannot ensure the success of their 
actions, as they are limited by various unknowns, often in the form of 
market uncertainties. Their decisions therefore require an additional 
degree of protection; courts have responded by dismissing claims 
where a director acted in good faith, but it becomes clear in hindsight 
																																																																																																																																	
 119. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1317, 1323 (N.Y. 
1990). 
 120. See id.; see also Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 
P.2d 940, 947-50 (Cal. 1999); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, 523 
N.Y.S.2d 523, 528-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
 121. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
 122. See, e.g., Levandusky, 533 N.E.2d at 1322. 
 123. See, e.g., Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condo., 401 A.2d 280, 285-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1979) (applying a hybrid reasonableness/business analysis to a condominium associa-
tion’s decision to impose penalties on unit owners who failed to pay part of assessment). 
 124. Franzese, supra note 34, at 668. 
 125. Id. See also Gott, supra note 59, at 216 n.104 (explaining that the purposes behind 
the business judgment rule are not served by its application to community associations). 
 126. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). 
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that she acted in a way that ultimately hurt the corporation.127 In 
contrast, community associations do not deal with nearly the same 
breadth of challenges. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to grant 
association directors the presumption of the business judgment rule 
on the basis that their primary task is to protect property values, 
thus equating their function with that of a traditional corporate di-
rector. This is hardly their sole function.  
 A number of other courts have evaluated the actions of association 
boards under a more general standard of “reasonableness.”128 While 
typically not as deferential as the business judgment rule, this can 
still be a very deferential standard, depending on the court applying 
it. In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n,129 the Su-
preme Court of California upheld the validity of a residential com-
munity’s ban on household pets.130 A California statute established 
that a community association’s CC&Rs are enforceable “unless un-
reasonable.”131 The court identified three circumstances under which 
a particular covenant, condition, or restriction might be deemed un-
reasonable: “[the restriction] violates public policy; it bears no ration-
al relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose 
of the affected land; or it otherwise imposes burdens on the affected 
land that are so disproportionate to the restriction’s beneficial effects 
that the restriction should not be enforced.”132 The court emphasized 
that the outcome of cases where the validity of a private CC&R is at 
issue should not rest on a case-by-case inquiry into the objecting 
homeowner’s particular circumstances. 133  Rather, the appropriate 
inquiry concerns the effect of the restriction on the community as a 
whole, and whether the restriction is so repugnant as to fit into one 
of the three categories of exceptions identified by the court.134 In es-
tablishing such a deferential standard, the court made clear that it 
was sympathetic to protecting the reasonable expectations of con-
senting homeowners. The court also expressed concern over the po-
tential for “increases in association fees to fund the defense of legal 
challenges to recorded restrictions.”135  
 However, while the court in Nahrstedt undoubtedly imposed a 
substantial burden on those seeking to challenge a CC&R, it also 
																																																																																																																																	
 127. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (dis-
cussing the rationale behind the business judgment rule). 
 128. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal. 1994); see 
also River Terrace Condo. Ass’n v. Lewis, 514 N.E.2d 732, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
 129. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d 1275. 
 130. Id. at 1292. 
 131. Id. at 1286.  
 132. Id. at 1287. 
 133. Id. at 1290. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 1288. 
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may have created an avenue through which courts can provide relief 
to homeowners specifically in the realm of solar installations. The 
first of the three exceptional circumstances identified by the court 
concerns CC&Rs that are abhorrent to public policy.136 It follows that 
particularly where state legislatures have addressed the importance 
of solar energy via statute, this may create the requisite evidence of 
countervailing policy needed to overturn CC&Rs that restrict resi-
dential solar use. We will come back to this idea at the end of Part V.  
B.   Burden of Proof? 
 To make matters worse for homeowners seeking relief from bur-
densome restrictions, courts generally place the burden of demon-
strating that a CID’s land use restrictions are “unreasonable” square-
ly on the party challenging those restrictions.137 The burden of proof 
typically will remain with the homeowner, even where a state statute 
protects the homeowner from unreasonable restrictions that “effec-
tively prohibit” or “unduly interfere” with the placement and/or func-
tioning of a solar device. 138  This stems from the legal principle 
whereby a “party seeking a right or benefit under a statute bears the 
burden of proving that he comes within the ambit of the statute.”139  
 This is exemplified in Fox Creek Community Ass’n v. Carson,140 
where the court stated at the outset of its analysis that “the home-
owner has the burden to show that a deed restriction effectively pro-
hibits a solar device.”141 The court in Garden Lakes Community Ass’n 
v. Madigan142 echoed this sentiment in stating, “[t]he Association cor-
rectly asserts that the burden of proof was on the homeowners to 
prove that the Declaration and guidelines effectively prohibited them 
from installing and using a solar energy device.”143 
C.   The Interaction of CC&Rs and Solar Access Laws—A Case Study  
  The 2011 case Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Grif-
fin144 consisted of a familiar factual scenario. A homeowner wanted to 
																																																																																																																																	
 136. Id. at 1287-88. 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 1286 (discussing the burden of showing a particular land use re-
striction rests on the party challenging the land use restriction). 
 138. See Fox Creek Cmty. Ass’n v. Carson, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0676, 2012 WL 2793206, at 
*3 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 10, 2012) (unpublished) (noting that the burden rests with the 
homeowner to show that a deed restriction effectively prevents the installation of a solar 
device); see also Garden Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. Madigan, 62 P.3d 983, 987 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 139. Harvest v. Craig, 990 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
 140. Fox Creek Community Ass’n, 2012 WL 2793206. 
 141. Id. at *3. 
 142. Garden Lakes Community Ass’n, 62 P.3d 983. 
 143. Id. at 987. 
 144. 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  
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install a photovoltaic solar energy generation system on a hillside 
slope located on his property.145 The CC&Rs of the community re-
quired homeowners to submit all proposals for improvements to an 
Architectural Control Committee, which was made up of volunteers 
from the community.146 The committee denied the homeowner’s ap-
plication, citing CC&Rs pertaining to drainage and erosion as well as 
aesthetic considerations. 147  In spite of this, the homeowner went 
along with the installation, and the association brought suit.148 At 
trial, the jury found in favor of the association, and the homeowner 
subsequently appealed.149  
 In upholding the trial court’s decision, the district court of appeals 
found that “[t]he determination of whether Tesoro’s CC & R’s and 
Design Guidelines imposed ‘reasonable’ restrictions was necessarily a 
question of fact for the jury.”150 Yet the court also undertook its own 
analysis of the reasonableness of the association’s actions. 151  The 
court began with familiar rhetoric, noting the “presumption of validi-
ty” generally afforded to CC&Rs, absent a showing that, as estab-
lished in Nahrstedt, “they are wholly arbitrary, violate a fundamen-
tal public policy or impose a burden on the use of affected land that 
far outweighs any benefit.”152 Along similar lines, the court afforded 
substantial weight to the decision of the association’s committee to 
deny the installation.153  
 However, the court also conducted an inquiry into the limitations 
on a community association’s authority to regulate solar devices set 
forth in California’s solar access law,154 demonstrating that courts 
will pay close attention to these laws in determining how they impact 
an analysis of a traditional homeowner-community association dis-
pute. California’s residential solar access law allows for community 
associations to impose “reasonable restrictions on solar energy sys-
tems. . . . that do not significantly increase the cost of the system or 
significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that 
allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and 
energy conservation benefits.”155 In 2004, California went the extra 
																																																																																																																																	
 145. Id. at 171. 
 146. Id. at 170-71. 
 147. Id. at 172. 
 148. Id. at 173. 
 149. Id. at 175. 
 150. Id. at 176 (citations omitted). 
 151. Id. at 177-79. 
 152. Id. at 177 (quoting Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1287 
(Cal. 1994)). 
 153. Id. at 178 (“The CC & R’s provide that the approval or disapproval of applications 
for improvements ‘shall be in the sole and absolute discretion of the [ACC] and may be 
based upon such aesthetic considerations as the [ACC] determines to be appropriate.’ ”). 
 154. Id. at 177-79. 
 155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(b) (West 2012). 
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mile and amended its statute to actually define, via reference to nu-
merical valuations, what is meant by “significantly increase cost” and 
decrease efficiency.156 The statute states that restrictions on photo-
voltaic systems cannot decrease the system’s efficiency by more than 
twenty percent or increase its cost by more than $2000.157 The nail in 
the coffin for the homeowner in Tesoro was expert testimony indicat-
ing that solar energy systems permitted by the association were com-
parable to the one installed by the homeowner in terms of efficiency 
and cost.158 The court cited the expert’s findings that an alternative 
system would only decrease efficiency by fourteen percent and would 
actually be cheaper.159 
 There is a fundamental tension in cases such as Tesoro between 
courts wanting to fall back on old habits and accord deference to 
community associations, and solar access laws that seem to be pull-
ing them in the other direction. The following section describes con-
crete ways by which state legislatures can construct solar access laws 
that effectively protect homeowners—and what role courts can play 
in the process. 
V.   LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 
 When it comes to residential solar access laws, policymakers have 
several models from which to choose. They can opt for a broad, minis-
terial approach like that of Oregon, though it remains to be seen how 
such a law interacts with CC&Rs in addition to whether it can with-
stand scrutiny under the Contract Clause.160 By far and away the 
most popular form involves exceptions for CC&Rs that do not “undu-
ly restrict” solar devices or that impose “reasonable restrictions.”161 
Some states, such as California, take the next step and create guide-
lines as to what constitutes a reasonable restriction.162  Finally, a 
handful of state statutes do not utilize a “reasonableness” standard 
but rather establish themselves the precise ways in which communi-
ty associations may regulate solar devices.163  
																																																																																																																																	
 156. 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 789 (West) (“This bill would redefine the term ‘signifi-
cantly’ with regard to the restrictions imposed on solar domestic water heating systems or 
swimming pool heating systems and photovoltaic systems, as specified.”). 
 157. CIV. § 714(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
 158. Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 178-79.  
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra Part III.B (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 227.505 (2012)). 
 161. See supra Part III.A (discussing the various types of state solar access laws). 
 162. CIV. § 714(d). 
 163. See infra Appendix A. Three states have adopted a “reasonable-free” approach: 
Texas, Hawaii, and New Jersey. New Jersey’s statute, for example, reads as follows:  
b. An association may adopt rules to regulate the installation and maintenance 
of solar collectors on those roofs as specified in subsection a. of this section, in 
accordance with subsection c. of this section, and as follows: (1) The qualifica-
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 This section identifies four essential attributes of a solar access 
law that effectively protects the rights of homeowners in CIDs. A 
common theme connects them all: States should craft laws that di-
vest the courts, to the greatest extent possible, of their discretionary 
power in analyzing the “reasonableness” of a community association’s 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions pertaining to solar energy use. 
Not only will this help curb the broad judicial deference afforded to 
community associations, but it will also serve to guide both residents 
and community associations in helping them establish who has what 
rights in the realm of residential solar installations.  
A.   Specify the Scope  
 Legislators must make absolutely clear that the provisions of a 
solar access law apply to all association governed communities and 
their CC&Rs. The importance of this is illustrated in the evolution of 
Florida’s solar access law.164 The statute as originally enacted read as 
follows: “[T]he adoption of an ordinance by a governing body, as those 
terms are defined in this chapter, which prohibits or has the effect of 
prohibiting the installation of solar collectors, clotheslines, or other 
energy devices based on renewable resources is expressly prohibited.”165  
 In 1991, John Taylor installed a rooftop solar energy system on his 
Palm Beach County home.166 His community association brought suit 
seeking to require Taylor to remove the device.167 The Fourth District 
Court of Appeals held that the above-cited statute did not apply to 
community associations.168 Another statute defined “governing bod-
ies” as political entities; in the court’s view, community associations 
																																																																																																																																	
tions, certification and insurance requirements of personnel or contractors who 
may install the solar collectors; (2) The location where solar collectors may be 
placed on roofs; (3) The concealment of solar collectors’ supportive structures, 
fixtures and piping; (4) The color harmonization of solar collectors with the col-
ors of structures or landscaping in the development; and (5) The aggregate size 
or coverage or total number of solar collectors … (1) An association shall not 
adopt and shall not enforce any rule related to the installation or maintenance 
of solar collectors, if compliance with a rule or rules would increase the solar 
collectors’ installation or maintenance costs by an amount which is estimated 
to be greater than 10 percent of the total cost of the initial installation of the so-
lar collectors, including the costs of labor and equipment. (2) An association 
shall not adopt and shall not enforce any rule related to the installation or 
maintenance of solar collectors, if compliance with such rules inhibits the solar 
collectors from functioning at their intended maximum efficiency. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:22A-48.2b.-c. (West 2012). There is no reference to reasonableness in 
the statute. Instead, the state lays out the ways in which solar CC&Rs may regulate solar 
devices and the relevant criteria to assess compliance (a cost and efficiency standard).  
 164. FLA. STAT. § 163.04 (2012). 
 165. Id. § 163.04 (1989). 
 166. Taylor v. Ridge at the Bluffs Homeowners Ass’n, 579 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1991). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 896-97. 
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did not fit under this definition.169 The original statute did not clearly 
identify whether it applied to community associations. It should come 
as no surprise at this point that in the wake of this uncertainty, the 
court defaulted to an association-friendly interpretation that protect-
ed the enforceability of CC&Rs.170  
 One year later, Florida responded by inserting an additional pro-
vision in the statute, which read:  
No deed restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements 
running with the land shall prohibit or have the effect of prohibit-
ing solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices based on 
renewable resources from being installed on buildings erected on 
the lots or parcels covered by the deed restrictions, covenants, or 
binding agreements. A property owner may not be denied permis-
sion to install solar collectors or other energy devices based on re-
newable resources by any entity granted the power or right in any 
deed restriction, covenant, or similar binding agreement to ap-
prove, forbid, control, or direct alteration of property with respect 
to residential dwellings not exceeding three stories in height.171 
 In 2008, the Florida legislature added additional protection for 
homeowners in CIDs by replacing the phrase “not exceeding three sto-
ries in height” with “within the boundaries of a condominium unit.”172   
B.   Define “Reasonable” Restrictions as Narrowly as Possible 
Through References to Numerical Valuations of Cost and Efficiency  
 As previously discussed, statutes that utilize the term “reasona-
bleness” in defining the permitted means by which a community as-
sociation may regulate the installation and placement of solar panels 
might have an advantage if subjected to a challenge under the Con-
tract Clause.173 However, whether the statute uses “reasonableness,” 
“effectively prohibits,” “unduly interferes with,” et cetera, it is criti-
cally important that the statute goes on to define with specificity 
what this term really means. Doing so serves to limit the potential 
interpretations an association board or court can come up with on its 
own. The ideal means by which to define these terms is through ref-
erence to cost and efficiency. Reasonable restrictions ought to be de-
fined as those that do not potentially increase the cost of installation 
																																																																																																																																	
 169. § 163.3164 (1989); Taylor, 579 So. 2d at 897. 
 170. See Taylor, 579 So. 2d at 896-97. 
 171.  Act effective Oct. 1, 1992, ch. 92-89, § 1(2), 1992 Fla. Laws 845, 845-46 (emphasis 
added) (codified as amended at § 163.04 (1992)). 
 172. § 163.04(2) (2012) (“A property owner may not be denied permission to install 
solar collectors or other energy devices by any entity granted the power or right in any 
deed restriction, covenant, declaration, or similar binding agreement to approve, forbid, 
control, or direct alteration of property with respect to residential dwellings and within the 
boundaries of a condominium unit.” (emphasis added)). 
 173. See supra Part III.A. 
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or decrease the efficiency of operation more than a specified percent-
age, ideally something along the lines of ten or fifteen percent. While 
a handful of states already maintain such provisions,174 the vast ma-
jority of residential solar access laws do not. Statutes should strive to 
specify a numerical value so as to take this determination out of the 
hands of courts and association boards. 
 Consider, for example, Arizona’s solar access law: 
A. Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, 
an association shall not prohibit the installation or use of a solar 
energy device . . . . 
B. An association may adopt reasonable rules regarding the 
placement of a solar energy device if those rules do not prevent the 
installation, impair the functioning of the device or restrict its use 
or adversely affect the cost or efficiency of the device.  
C. Notwithstanding any provision of the community documents, 
the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to any 
party who substantially prevails in an action against the board of 
directors of the association for a violation of this section.175  
 This is not a bad law by any means, as it provides some guidance 
as to what constitutes reasonableness through a reference to cost and 
efficiency. However, by not defining efficiency and cost with a refer-
ence to specific numerical values, the statute leaves too much discre-
tion in the hands of courts and association boards. Is a thirty percent 
increase in cost reasonable? What about fifty percent? The deference 
likely to be accorded to a community association’s decision in such a 
situation has (hopefully) been established at this point. 
 Instead of making any reference to “reasonableness” and thus in-
stilling a reviewing court or community association with some inkling 
of discretion, no matter how small, states might alternatively choose 
to enumerate via statute precisely what sort of restrictions or prohi-
bitions a community association may enforce. Texas’ solar access law 
provides an excellent example of such specificity. Passed in 2011, the 
statute reads, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by [s]ubsection (d), a 
property owners’ association may not include or enforce a provision in 
a dedicatory instrument that prohibits or restricts a property owner 
from installing a solar energy device.”176 Subsection (d) specifies how 
																																																																																																																																	
 174. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(d) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. §196-7(b) (2012) (“Eve-
ry private entity shall adopt rules by December 31, 2006, that provide for the placement of 
solar energy devices, and revise those rules as necessary by July 1, 2011. The rules shall 
facilitate the placement of solar energy devices and shall not impose conditions or re-
strictions that render the device more than twenty-five per cent less efficient or increase 
the cost of installation, maintenance, and removal of the device by more than fifteen per 
cent.”). 
 175. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816 (2012). 
 176. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 202.010(b) (West 2012). 
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a community may regulate a solar device.177 Enforceable restrictions 
include: height, slope, and color requirements as well as the require-
ment that the homeowner seek approval from an association board.178 
However, the board may not withhold approval if the homeowner 
complies with the other requirements of subsection (d) “unless the 
association . . . determines in writing that placement of the device as 
proposed by the property owner constitutes a condition that substan-
tially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unrea-
sonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities.”179 
C. Eliminate the Ability of Community Associations to Restrict Solar 
Devices on Solely Aesthetic Grounds 
 While states may choose to allow community associations to con-
tinue to restrict solar panels in certain ways, restrictions based solely 
on aesthetic justifications should be removed from that calculus. A 
2007 survey found that fifty-nine percent of CID residents believe 
their community association should have the right to restrict the sit-
ing and use of solar devices on aesthetic grounds.180 Yet as one com-
mentator noted, “[i]n this situation the residential majority is just 
plain wrong.”181  
 Although some CID residents may take comfort in the fact that 
every house on the street is white with fuchsia trim and a white 
picket fence, ensuring uniformity should not be a viable justification 
for prohibiting solar devices considering the substantial economic 
and environmental benefits associated with solar energy. Moreover, 
while some consider solar devices an eyesore, others may find them 
aesthetically pleasing or, at the very least, minimally distracting. 
Residents may believe that the aesthetic restrictions imposed by 
their community associations are protecting their property values, 
but there is limited data to support this claim.182 In the absence of a 
more concrete justification, states should seek to limit the power of 
community associations to restrict the solar rights of homeowners on 
aesthetic grounds alone. The Texas statute previously cited sets a 
good example by requiring an association to show that a homeowner’s 
solar device causes “unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons 
of ordinary sensibilities.”183  
 Moreover, when it comes to aesthetic-based CC&Rs affecting solar 
devices, courts have once again demonstrated they will carefully con-
																																																																																																																																	
 177. Id. § 202.010(d).  
 178. Id. § 202.010(d)(5). 
 179. Id. § 202.010(e). 
 180. ZOGBY INT’L, supra note 48, at 19. 
 181. Caffrey, supra note 5, at 722. 
 182. See supra Part II.B (regarding the effect of CIDs on property values). 
 183. PROP. § 202.010(e). 
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sider whether any applicable solar access law has addressed the le-
gitimacy of such restrictions. To return once more to Tesoro, the court 
noted that when associations consider applications for solar projects, 
“[n]othing in the language of section 714 [of the California Solar 
Rights Act] prohibits the consideration of aesthetic impacts.”184 The 
court also cited language from California’s solar access law indicating 
the legislature intended applications for solar projects to be processed 
and approved according to the same standards and procedures as any 
other application for an architectural modification.185 Had Califor-
nia’s law contained a measure prohibiting aesthetic restrictions from 
being the sole basis upon which a solar application is denied, the 
court would have had to reconsider its analysis.  
D.   Affirmative Statement of Public Policy   
 Solar access laws should ideally leave little doubt as to their in-
tent. One should not have to search through legislative history to find 
an affirmative declaration that in passing this law, State X intends to 
promote the residential use of solar energy systems and the removal 
of all impediments and obstacles to this extent. Once again, the pur-
pose here is to provide a clear statement of intent to any potential 
reviewing body. States should endeavor to equip courts with as many 
tools as possible by which to protect the rights of homeowners.  
 California’s solar access law has an exemplary provision: 
(b) This section does not apply to provisions that impose reasona-
ble restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it is the policy of 
the state to promote and encourage the use of solar energy systems 
and to remove obstacles thereto. Accordingly, reasonable re-
strictions on a solar energy system are those restrictions that do 
not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly de-
crease its efficiency or specified performance, or that allow for an 
alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and energy    
conservation benefits.186   
The California legislature leaves little doubt as to the statute’s in-
tent. The importance of incorporating a statement of policy into the 
statute itself will become clearer in the next subsection. 
E.   A Role for the Courts—Deference to Solar Access Laws and    
Tapping into the “Public Policy” Exception 
 Where states take the advice of this Note and utilize numerical 
valuations to define reasonable restrictions, one can envision cases 
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boiling down to “battles of the experts,” or in other words, whether a 
particular deed restriction is affecting the cost and performance of a 
solar device by more or less than what is specified in the statute. In 
such a situation, will courts side with the association and afford them 
their usual deference? Or will they sympathize with homeowners 
seeking protection under solar access laws? Courts are needed in 
these and similar situations to lay down strong precedent in favor of 
homeowners and residential access to solar energy. Where statutes 
fall short in fully enumerating the solar rights of homeowners, or 
where there is a unique factual scenario not contemplated by the leg-
islature, courts can fall back on a potentially powerful tool, should 
they choose to do so—the public policy exception.  
 Recall that in Nahrstedt, the court established three potential 
lines of reasoning through which a reviewing court might invalidate 
a particular covenant, condition, or restriction pertaining to real 
property.187 The first of these is the so-called public policy exception: 
a court may decline to enforce a deed restriction that is shown to be 
patently in violation of public policy.188 Naturally, this sort of inquiry 
provides a lot of room for a court to draw its own conclusions. Yet the 
mere existence of a statute addressing residential solar access rights 
should provide evidence that association restrictions affecting the use 
and/or placement of a solar device are not in accordance with public 
policy–even where said statute does not clearly identify the state’s 
policy with regard to solar energy.  
 In the 2003 case of Garden Lakes Community Ass’n v. Madigan,189 
homeowners in an Arizona CID installed a solar energy generation 
system on their home.190 In doing so, they failed to comply with a 
number of the community’s CC&Rs, including aesthetic requirements 
and a requirement that they seek prior approval from the association 
board.191 However, the court found in favor of the homeowners, hold-
ing that the community’s CC&Rs “effectively prohibited” the home-
owners from installing a solar device within the meaning of Arizona’s 
solar access law.192 Particularly noteworthy is that the court invoked 
the public policy exception in support of its holding.193 The court cited 
to Nahrstedt in stating that the present situation was distinguishable 
in that “no state law established a public policy preference for allow-
ing homeowners to keep animals, have rooftop antennas, or store old 
vehicles. In contrast, here we must consider the application of a spe-
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cific statute that nullifies enforcement of deed restrictions that effec-
tively prohibit the installation and use of SEDs.”194  
 Furthermore, the court came to its decision in spite of the fact that 
Arizona’s solar rights law195 did not contain an affirmative statement 
of public policy.196 Fortunately for the homeowners, the court made a 
substantial inquiry into the policy behind the statute, utilizing “the 
statute’s context, language, subject matter, historical background, 
effects and consequences, spirit and purpose.”197 Yet as mentioned 
previously, there is fierce debate within the judicial community over 
how much weight to afford legislative history and intent, among var-
ious other factors, in interpreting statutes.198 This serves to again 
highlight the significance of state legislatures including such an af-
firmative statement of public policy in their solar access laws.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Although economic costs are often cited as the greatest barrier to 
the proliferation of solar energy in the United States, legal con-
straints are often overlooked. As one commentator recently noted, 
“[t]he potential renewable energy from residential solar use and the 
potential legal barriers to utilizing that energy are staggering.”199 
Uncertainty regarding the legality of a solar installation has the ca-
pacity to derail many a potential project.200 Legal fees are all too often 
another cost to be borne by citizens who are forced into court to de-
fend their installation of a solar device.201 Furthermore, while the 
cost and efficiency of solar energy is largely determined by the mar-
																																																																																																																																	
 194. Id. at 989 (internal citation omitted) (substituting “SEDs” for “Solar Energy De-
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 195. The statute at issue in the case was ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-439 (2003). The 
Arizona statute cited above, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1816, was passed in 2007 and, in 
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 201. See Garden Lakes, 62 P.3d at 986; Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. 
Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rod-
man, 227 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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ketplace and the pace of technological development, substantial con-
trol can be exerted over the legal regulation of solar energy.  
 Although it might be argued that community associations are 
themselves “democratic”202 organizations, and residents are generally 
capable of changing the rules from within, in practice, this can prove 
challenging. Changes to established CC&Rs often require a superma-
jority of homeowners.203 Moreover, homeowners in CIDs are frequent-
ly apathetic when it comes to participating in their community gov-
ernments.204 In one study, “most people surveyed had not only never 
attended a meeting but knew neither who is on the board nor the is-
sues facing their neighborhood association.”205 
 Yet not all common interest developments are resistant to the idea 
of solar energy; in fact, some are outright embracing it. All of the 
ninety-plus homes in the aptly named Armory Park Del Sol in Tuc-
son, Arizona were built with solar water heaters and electrical sys-
tems.206 As a result, residents pay about $300 per year in electric 
bills, despite Arizona’s desert climate.207 Similarly, twenty percent of 
the homes in the solar-friendly community of Del Sur in San Diego, 
California are equipped with solar electric systems.208 Community 
associations, via their assessment fees and communal governance, 
are actually in a position to be pioneers in the realm of residential 
solar energy use—if it is something that they choose to prioritize. 
However, communities like Armory Park Del Sol and Del Sur are 
currently the exception rather than the rule.  
 Covenants, conditions, and restrictions imposed by communities 
in times past were frequently intended to achieve a purpose most 
would consider insidious today. Consider, for example, the restrictive 
covenants enacted by communities in the mid-20th century designed 
to prevent African Americans and other minority groups from owning 
property. Perhaps someday future generations will view the efforts of 
community associations to restrict renewable energy technology with 
similar disdain. Until then, if states are serious about ushering in an 
era of renewable energy, they must take care to craft their statutes in 
a way that clearly reflects this intent. If legislatures effectuate good 
laws that force the hand of courts, so to speak, the path to wide-
spread residential solar use might just get a little bit brighter.  
																																																																																																																																	
 202. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 147 (describing CIDs as an attempt to “realize 
democracy through private ordering”). 
 203. MCKENZIE, supra note 33, at 147. 
 204. See Alexander, supra note 54, at 158-60. 
 205. Id. at 159. The author also points out the parallels between general political apa-
thy in the United States and the apathy within CIDs. Id. at 148-63.  
 206. Tamara Lytle, Harvest the Green, COMMON GROUND, July-Aug. 2009, at 23.  
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 26. 
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VII.   APPENDIX A:                                                                              
HOW STATE SOLAR ACCESS LAWS ADDRESS CC&RS209 
 
 
*Oregon’s solar access law, discussed in Part III.B, is not included on 




209.	 Table compiled utilizing Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 
DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited July 6, 2013).	
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